In this paper we investigate whether contagion is present in the banking sector by analyzing how banks are affected by negative earnings surprises from their competitors. The banking sector is of crucial importance for the economy and, thus, highly regulated on an individual bank level. However, a high degree of contagion risk should call for a regulation of the financial network rather than solely regulating on an individual level. To be able to make a judgement about the magnitude of possible contagion effects we compare the results of the banking sector with the results of the non-banking industries. We find that earnings surprises cause significant contagion in the banking sector. In contrast, we do not find this effect in the non-banking sectors, including the insurance sector. The magnitude of contagion in the banking sector is positively related with the size of the bank reporting an earnings surprise, as well as the size of the affected banks.
I Introduction
In this paper, we empirically investigate whether contagion effects exist in the banking sector.
1 This question is of interest since the banking sector is of crucial importance for the entire economy. Due to the high degree of interconnection with other sectors, a crisis in the banking sector could lead to severe consequences for the economy. Thus, to prevent such crises, the banking sector is highly regulated -although, regulation takes place mainly on an individual bank level. The presence of contagion effects, which increases the risk of a systemic financial crisis, i.e. the systemic risk in the financial system, calls for a regulation which takes the multiple linkages within the system into account and minimizes the risks due to spill-over effects.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing whether negative earnings surprises have contagious effects in the banking sector, i.e. whether they cause the reporting bank's competitors to react on the new information. We furthermore compare the banking sector with all the other industry sectors, especially the insurance sector, to investigate the question whether the banking sector behaves differently.
Earnings announcements provide information about the true value of the company and claims on it. If market prices before the announcement are based on the earnings expectations and markets are efficient, a negative surprise will lead to an immediate devaluation of the firms' value. As earnings surprises are clear cut micro events (a macro-shock would result in adjustments of analysts earnings expectations and thus, no earnings surprise would be observable), these are perfectly suited for the purpose of studying contagion.
Whether the competitors security prices of a firm react negatively, positively, or not at all, depends on the type of information and the structure of the sector. If the information is firm specific and if no linkages exist with the other firms, only the respective company security prices should react. However, negative information like a decrease in sales forecasts could be related to sector specific information and thus, reveal information for the entire sector, yielding adverse reactions of competitor security prices. This type of negative reaction is commonly referred to as information contagion.
Additionally, a firm specific event resulting in an adverse announcement can also have direct negative consequences for the competitors. This is the case if inter-firm connections increasing the default risk of the competitors through the increased risk of the originating firm exist. The best example -which is also the motivation of our study -is the banking sector in which strong connections exist between the institutions through the interbank lending and borrowing market. Thus, a credit event at one bank could spill over to other ones, easily leading to an increase in default risk of the entire sector, i.e. an increase in systemic risk.
However, a firm specific event could also lead to the opposite effect. As discussed in Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) , if imperfect competition is prevailing in the sector, problems in competing firms could allow firms to increase their prices or their market share to earn (at least temporary) an additional rent. 2 This effect is not exclusive for operating problems, as financial problems can cause negative reputation which possibly causes customers to refrain from doing business with the firm as analyzed by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) , and thus, switching to a competing producer or service provider.
Taking everything into account, when adverse events happen, the observable consequences will be the sum of the aforementioned effects. Theoretically, there is no reason why one or the other effect should be predominant.
To detect possible contagion effects, we employ traditional event study methodology.
The event study literature on the reaction of security prices due to the release of new information is extensive. Most papers analyze the effects on the company to which the new information applies. Stock price reactions after quarterly earnings announcements were first analyzed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Jones and Litzenberger (1970) . They find that earnings surprises indeed is new information which is incorporated in stock prices of the reporting company.
The literature on intra-industry contagion is no where near as extensive. Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) study the intra-industry effects due to bankruptcies (announcements), where the first paper measures the effects on the stock, the latter on the credit default swap market. Both studies conclude that intra-industry contagion effects after bankruptcies exist. In addition, Jorion and Zhang (2007) find that this result holds for chapter 11 bankruptcies only. For chapter 7 bankruptcies the authors find contrary evidence, although it is statistically weak due to only 22 relevant observations.
The first paper analyzing intra-industry effects following earnings surprises is Foster (1981) , where a relatively small sample of 75 events is studied. A negative impact of a firm's earnings release on the stock prices of other firms operating in the same sector is found only, if the announcing firm reacts negatively itself. Han et al. (1989) study the effect of voluntarily disclosed earnings forecasts of managers and find evidence for contagious effects. Other studies finding evidence for information transfers following earnings surprises include Han and Wild (1990) and Ramnath (2002) . Akhigbe et al. (1997) detect intra-industry effects of bond rating changes using a sample of 354 events reported in The Wall Street Journal. The effect of rating changes on earnings forecasts of rival firms, i.e. firms operating in the same industry, is studied by Caton and Goh (2003) . They find significant effects, but only if the downgraded firm is non-investment grade.
None of the studies mentioned above consider the banking sector separately. The sample of Lang and Stulz (1992) does not contain any events in the banking sector. The other cited studies report their results on an aggregated level only, which may be due to the small sample sizes.
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A few papers analyzing adverse events in the banking sector do exist. Akhigbe and Madura (2001) study 99 publicized bank failures and find contagion effects on rival banks, which are stronger when the failed bank is large, a multibank holding, or publicly held.
The contagion effects of dividends reductions at banks are analyzed by Slovin et al. (1999) . Their main finding is that these reductions are negative events for both, large super-regional banks as well as regional banks themselves, but only cuts at super-regional banks have negative consequences on stock prices of other banks.
Our study is closely related to this strand of literature. We fill the gap in the literature between studies on intra-industry contagion effects of earnings surprises and studies of the banking sector. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing contagion effects in the banking sector due to negative earnings surprises. Furthermore, we are the first to compare the results with the average of the non-banking sectors, and especially the insurance sector, which is a second highly regulated sector of the US economy.
The main results of our study are as follows. We find that negative earnings surprises cause significant contagion effects in the banking sector. In contrast, the non-banking sectors show, on average, no signs of contagious behavior. The difference between the banking sector and the non-banking sectors proves to be highly significant. When analyzing the insurance sector separately, we do not find any contagion effects which indicates a smaller degree of systemic risk in the insurance sector. Finally, we find that contagion in the banking sector is the strongest, if the originator as well as the affected institutions are important banks. These results support the need for a system-based regulation of the banking sector.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II contains a description of the study design including the used data set. In Section III, we present the empirical results. Concluding remarks are stated in Section IV.
II Design of the Study
A. Goal and Overview of the Study 
B. Data
We analyze the effects of negative earnings surprises on the stock prices of the affected firms' competitors over the sample period January 1st, 1990 through March 21st, 2007
in the United States using traditional event study methodology.
4
The earnings data is obtained from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) retrieved via Thomson Financial Datastream. 5 We focus our study on the US, as data availability regarding I/B/E/S is by far the best. We obtain the time series of analysts' mean forecasts of earnings per share for the following quarter as well as the number of analysts covering the particular company. We then exclude all observations for which less than three analysts report earnings forecasts. Additionally, the cross-sectional standard deviations of the analysts' forecasts are obtained. For each observed earnings forecast we sample the subsequently reported earnings per share. To do this, we have to determine the precise date on which the earnings were reported. This information is obtained from the Worldscope database, and used as the event date in the following study.
We calculate Standardized Unexpected Earnings using two different approaches. First, we follow Foster et al. (1984) (model 1) and Han and Wild (1990) and compute the relative deviation of the reported earnings from the forecasted earnings, precisely,
for company i and quarter t. EP S i,t is the mean forecast one day prior to the release of the realized earnings; EP S i,t is the subsequently reported earnings per share. In Equation (1), the deviation of the forecast from the realized earnings is standardized by the absolute value of the realized earnings, yielding a relative surprise measure. As can been seen directly from the definition of SU E 1 i,t , this way to standardize the earnings surprise could be problematic in case the company realize earnings of very small size or even zero.
Thus, to assure the robustness of the analysis with respect to the chosen surprise measure, we standardize the earnings surprise in a second way. The absolute earnings surprise is normalized by the dispersion of the analysts' forecasts,
SU E
with σ[ EP S] denoting the cross-sectional standard deviation of the analysts' forecasts.
This approach, which has also been used in the literature, e.g. by Datta and Dhillon (1993) or Mendenhall (2004) , incorporates the degree of surprise; a deviation from the mean forecast will be less surprising if there is a high level of discordance about the future earnings among the analysts. Analogous to our first standardization, where the Standardized Unexpected Earnings is not well defined when an earnings observation of zero occurs, this second way to normalize the earnings surprise suffers from the possibility of a zero denominator. This situation occurs if all analysts reporting to I/B/E/S exactly agree regarding their earnings forecast. Furthermore, earnings or dispersion values close to zero might distort our analysis as the standardized earnings surprises will become very are computed this way, using an outlier cleaned data set. To ensure robustness with respect to the outlier treatment, we have repeated the entire study once without the second step of deleting the outliers and once using a five-sigma interval instead of the three-sigma interval, both yielding very similar results, statistically undistinguishable.
As an additional robustness check, we have adopted the ad-hoc approach of Mendenhall (2004) to set σ[ EP S] = 0.01 if the reported standard deviation is zero. Again, no notable differences appeared.
C. Abnormal Returns
The subsequent analysis is based on the same period as our event data was sampled from. We group the event data by industry sector based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), resulting in 38 sectors. 6 The list of these sectors is reported in Table   1 .
To measure the reaction of competitors, i.e. firms operating mainly in the same industry sector, we sample stock market returns of all companies from the respective sectors traded at NASDAQ and covered by I/B/E/S during the examined time period. As we do not require data availability over the entire sample period, the competitor portfolio is changing as firms list/delist at NASDAQ or analysts begin/abort covering firms.
Following other studies (e.g. Akhigbe et al. (1997) or Jorion and Zhang (2007)), we form equally weighted competitor portfolios. An alternative method is to form value weighted portfolios. This would relate to the overall wealth effects in the economy; however, as we want to measure the average reaction, and not the value weighted reaction of companies to adverse news from their competitors, equally weighted returns are more appropriate in this context. For each event date t, we define the abnormal return AR p,t of a competitor portfolio p as the difference between the realized return R p,t and the expected normal return conditioning on information up to time t denoted by X t :
The realized return is computed from end of day prices as total return, i.e. including dividends and adjusted for other price, but not wealth relevant corporate actions, such as right issues and stock splits. The expected normal return is estimated according to the market model approach,
where R m,t denotes the market index return. As the market index we employ the S&P 500
as it is the major well diversified US stock market index. The two parametersα p and β p are sector specific and are estimated over the pre-event period [t −T , t −2 ] for each event. We choose the estimation window to cover approximately one year, i.e. T = 250.
Observations on other event dates are excluded from the estimation data to minimize possible correlation bias.
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal reaction, the standardized average abnormal returns follow the Student-t distribution with T − 2 degrees of freedom, which is approximately normal. The standard deviations of the abnormal returns are also estimated over the estimation windows. Following Mikkelson and Partch (1985) , we adjust the estimated standard deviations by the prediction error resulting in
where s 2 p,t is the residual variance from the market model adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by the method of Newey-West.
All events with overlapping event periods [−1, 1] are excluded from the analysis. We use this rather short event window to reduce problems from non-independent observations and to obtain a sufficient number of events. Compared with event studies analyzing the effects on the reporting company itself, the potential for overlapping event windows is much greater in our case, as each reporting company itself is also included in the competitor portfolio if another company from the same sector exhibits an event.
We calculate the abnormal returns for the event day [0] and the subsequent day [1] . This is done as we do not have precise information about the timing of the information release on the event day. If it were after the closing of the exchange, potential reactions would be observable on the following trading day and not on the event day.
III Empirical Results

A. Description of the SUE Data
In this section, we report the results of the intra-industry contagion analysis due to negative earnings surprises. In total we sample 6,019 events of negative SU E after removing all infinite values due to zero earnings per share or volatility of earnings estimate, but before filtering using the three-sigma interval as described in the previous section.
7 Table 3 reports the distribution of earnings surprises across the sample period. Except for the first two years, with almost no observations, the earnings surprise sample is well balanced across time. Table 4 reports the distribution of events across sectors. The smallest number of events is observed for the equity investments instruments sector. The 7 The original sample contained 6397 observations. Both values SU E 1 and SU E 2 are deleted if at least one of both is not well defined, resulting in a relative decrease of the sample size of 5.91 %. number of events in the banking sector is among the highest.
After deleting outliers not in the three-sigma interval, the data set decreases to 5,946
observations. Summary statistics of the cleaned sample are given in Table 5 . As we only consider negative earning surprises, the distribution is naturally skewed to the left yielding smaller mean than median values. The mean earnings surprise standardized by its absolute realization (SU E 1 ) is -0.27, with a minimum value of -5.0 and a maximum value of -0.0016. When standardizing using the dispersion of analyst forecasts (SU E 2 ) the mean is -2.17, the minimum and maximum values are -21.0 and -0.0170, respectively.
B. Results on Announcing Companies
First, we analyze the effect of negative earnings surprises on the reporting companies themselves. This analysis will show, whether on average the news indeed was a negative surprise, and we can verify the timing of the market responses to the new information, i.e. whether the reported date in the Worldscope database was actually the date of information release to the public. If the information was available to the public, or at least to the analysts making the forecasts, before the reported event date, or the date of reported earnings were not correct, we should, on average, not observe an abnormal reaction by the reporting company. In this case, we would not expect the competitor companies to react as well. i.e. news with a bigger negative surprise, the average abnormal returns decreases, as to expect, down to -0.78 % for SU E 1 < −5 % and -0.79 % for SU E 1 < −10 %, and -0.87 % for SU E 1 < −1 and -1.15 % for SU E 2 < −2. All abnormal returns in the various subsamples of Table 6 are significantly negative. Furthermore, the first ex-event day [1] also shows significant negative average returns, which are, however, in absolute terms, about 30 % smaller than the event day abnormal returns.
The magnitude of these company specific stock price reactions after negative earnings surprises are well in line with previous studies. Rendleman Jr. et al. (1982) report stock price reactions of -1.4 %, -1.0 %, -0.7 %, -0.2 %, and 0.1 % for the first to fifth decile of earnings surprises. As they also include positive surprises, only the first five deciles are comparable. Conditioning on SU E 2 < −1, Datta and Dhillon (1993) find an average negative stock price reaction on the event day of -1.39 % when preceding, and -0.94 % when following dividend surprises.
We conclude that the sampled earnings surprises were indeed negative news to the market and had a significant negative price impact on the reporting companies' stocks.
C. Results on Competitor Companies
The results for average abnormal returns and the significance levels of the abnormal returns of the competitor portfolios are reported in Table 7 . We display the results for the sample of all negative earnings surprises as well as for the same subsamples used in In contrast, the non-banking sectors show, on average, no signs of contagious behavior.
The average abnormal return of competitor portfolios is -0.0015 % on the event day and 0.0190 % on the subsequent day; both being not significantly different from zero, and thus, not showing any contagion effects.
Panel B and C condition on the relative deviation of the expectation from the realization.
As one expects, the abnormal return decreases conditioning on stronger deviations with -0.1300 % for SU E 1 < −5 % and -0.1781 % for SU E 1 < −10 % on the event day, both being highly significant with p-values below 0.01 for the t-test and below 0.02 for the Wilcoxon sign test. Again, no significant abnormal returns are observed on the first post event day.
Conditioning on the degree of surprise, measured by the unexpected earnings normalized with the dispersion of forecasts (SU E 2 ), yields similar results. The event date return increases (in absolute terms) by the degree of surprise to -0.0913 % and -0.1332 %.
Again, the post event date average abnormal return remains insignificant. In contrast, the average abnormal returns of the non-banking sectors are insignificant, even when conditioning on greater relative deviations or surprises.
To see whether the observed different behavior of the banking sector and the other sectors is also statistically significant, we test whether the difference of abnormal returns is different from zero using a standard t-test. Table 8 reports the results of this test. The difference on the event date is -0.0828 % for the entire set of negative earnings surprises, which is significant with a p-value of 0.0206. Conditioning on bigger surprises increases the difference and decreases the p-value down to 0.0043 for relative surprises below -10 %. Overall, the reported evidence suggests significantly higher negative reactions of This table reports the differences and significance levels between the average reaction of the banking sectors and the average reaction of the other sectors. ∆AR is the difference between the abnormal returns of the banking sector and the non-banking sectors reported in Table 7 . competitors in the banking sector compared with the non-banking sectors.
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One might ask whether the results of the conducted t-tests are biased by overlapping event windows of the banking and the non-banking sectors, and thus, correlated observations. If, for example, a negative earnings surprise in the banking sector has negative consequences for a subset of sectors and not the entire market, this effect would not be completely captured by the normalizing using expected returns based on the market model. However, if this cross-sectorial dependence is present in the considered data, it will decrease the possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis successfully, as the difference in abnormal return between the related sectors would decrease. Thus, our results can be regarded as conservative and would be even stronger if controlling for overlapping event windows of banking and non-banking earnings surprises.
A second highly regulated sector of the economy is the insurance sector. Similarly to Table 4 ), we report the pooled results. We consider both sectors together, however, as before, when forming competitor portfolios, only companies of the specific sector are considered. Table 9 reports the average abnormal stock returns for the insurance sector. Although the abnormal return of the reporting insurers' competitor portfolios are negative in most instances, the size is much smaller compared with the banking sector and only insignificantly smaller than the average of all sectors. For example, the observed abnormal return on the event day for the entire data set is -0.0049 %, -0.0843 % for the banking sector and -0.0015 % for the non-banking sectors. In all subsamples all significance tests fail to reject the hypothesis of an abnormal return greater than zero. 9 Therefore, in contrast to the banking sector, no contagion effects are observable in the sample of negative earnings surprises at the insurance companies considered.
D. Effect of Size of Announcing and Competitor Banks
Finally, we analyze whether the strength of the contagion effects differ in characteristics of the announcing banks. More precisely, we suspect that adverse events at more important banks cause stronger negative contagion effects at their competitors than adverse announcements from less important banks. The ' importance ' of a bank is proxied by its size, i.e. its market capitalization, which is also obtained from Thomson Financial
Datastream. We use the average market capitalization of the year in which the earnings surprise was reported. Based on this criterion, we split the banking sample by the average market capitalization of the sector, which is the annual average of the year in which the event takes place. A formal test of difference between the banking and insurance sector was also conducted. However, it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of a difference of zero at reasonable significance levels.
10 An alternative would be to split the sample by the median market capitalization. As the sample is not equally balanced with respect to size, the average value is, however, more appropriate in this context. a large bank is reporting a negative surprise, which is, however, not significant.
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In the next analysis, we also subdivide the competitor portfolio with respect to the size of the competitor banks. Two disjoint portfolios are formed, one containing smaller than average banks, the second bigger than average banks. We repeat the analysis for these two subsamples first, considering all events, i.e. not differentiating whether the reporting bank is a small or big one. Afterwards, we further subdivide the sample by size of the reporting bank as in the analysis at the beginning of this subsection. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 11 .
The left part of the table displays the average abnormal earning surprises for the portfolio of all big competitors, whereas the right part contains the results for the small competitor 
IV Conclusion
In this paper, we address the question of whether contagion is present in the US banking sector, measured by stock price reaction following negative earnings surprises. To put the results into perspective we compare the banking sector with the non-banking sectors.
Applying traditional event study methodology we find that negative earnings surprises are contagious in the banking sector. The degree of contagion is increased by the degree of surprise. The abnormal return of the banks' competitors portfolios is on average -0.08 % for all negative surprises and increases up to -0.18 % for greater earnings surprises. These results are significantly larger (in absolute terms) than the average abnormal returns for the non-banking sectors. Earnings surprises at important (big) banks cause more pronounced reactions at competitor banks than surprises at small banks. The highest degree of contagion is found for big banks, reacting on negative news at another big bank.
Given the importance of a stable banking system for the real economy, the existence of contagion effects makes it necessary to draw the attention of the regulator to the entire system, rather than regulating on an individual bank level. Potential contagion effects could translate through the banking system, leading to a systemic crisis.
Analyzing the second highly regulated sector -the insurance sector -separately, we do not find any signs of contagion in this sector. This finding supports the notion that a systemic regulation of the insurance sector is less important compared to the banking sector. The financial supervision should therefore focus on the banking sector when aiming to implement a system-based regulation.
